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vinced that the rule has become un-
sound in the circumstances of mod-
ern life." Id. at 27, 405 A.2d at 254.
The practical effect of McGarvey is
that an attesting witness with a crim-
inal conviction will not render a will
void ab initio. If such a will is contested,
the administrator will have an oppor-
tunity to prove the will in court. "Any
other result would be a needless trap
for the unwary testator who, by fail-
ing to discover an attesting witness'
prior criminal record, risks having his
will declared void." Id. at 28, 405 A.2d
at 255.
However, pursuant to the Mary-
land Evidence Acts, an attesting witness
with a conviction of perjury is incom-
petent to testify to prove the will.
McGarvey; MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC.
CODE ANN. §9-104 (1980). The ad-
ministrator must rely on secondary
evidence. Maryland case law provides
two alternatives regarding the next
best evidence in such a case. In
Greenhawkv. Quimby, 170 Md. 280,184
A. 485 (1936), the court held that an
attesting witness' signature was prop-
erly proved, in his absence, by the
other subscribing witnesses, and by
others, testifying that they each saw
the absent witness sign the document
in the decedent's presence. In Keefer v.
Zimmerman, 22 Md. 274 (1864), the
court held that proof of an attesting
witness' handwriting is admissible
where the testimony of the subscrib-
ing witness cannot be procured by
reason of absence, death, interest or
other disqualification.
An administrator proving a will
should try to keep the absent attest-
ing witness' perjury conviction from
the jury. It is well settled in a civil case
that failure of a party to produce a
witness who could testify on a mate-
rial issue gives rise to an inference
that the testimony would be unfavor-
able. Hitch v. Hall, 42 Md. App. 260,
399 A.2d 953 (1979); Critzerv. Shegogue,
236 Md. 411, 204 A.2d 180 (1964);
(opposing counsel's right to a jury
instruction); Hoverter v. Patuxent, 231
Md. 608,188 A.2d 696 (1963), (oppos-
ing counsel's right to comment to the
jury during argument). Therefore,
the administrator should file a pret-
rial motion in limine based on two
grounds: that reference to an attest-
ing witness' perjury conviction would
serve no other purpose except to
arouse the prejudice of the jury, and
that such a comment is not allowed
when the reasons for not calling a
witness are reasonable and proper. In
this situation it would be unethical
for the administrator to call an incom-
petent witness to the stand; thus his
failure to produce the attesting wit-
ness is both proper and reasonable.
Even though the McGarvey Court
relaxed the standard of competency
for attesting witnesses in Maryland,
most attorneys would prefer to fol-
low stricter standards so that the
wills for which they are responsible
would be sufficient under the strict-
est standards of all states. Attorneys
should keep in mind that it is very
dangerous for the testator to call
upon subscribing witnesses who are
not acquainted with him. Certainly,
attesting witnesses with criminal
records, who are minors or who have
a psychiatric disability should be
avoided. Finally, the fact that an at-
testing witness is also an executor,
guardian named in the will or a bene-
ficiary does not affect his compet-
ency. Estep v. Morris, 38 Md. 417 (1873);
Leitch v. Leitch, 114 Md. 336, 79 A. 600
(1911). Nonetheless, when choosing
attesting witnesses, common sense
should direct the wise attorney to also
avoid interested parties. Harris v. Pue,
29 Md. 535 (1874).
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The Right to Die
by Lynn K. Caudle
The right to die, the constitutional
right to privacy, voluntary euthana-
sia, rational suicide, terminal care,
natural death acts, self deliverance,
self determination. . .are all terms
which courts are increasingly con-
fronting as people seek to have a voice
in determining whether their lives
must be artificially prolonged where
there is no hope for cure and death is
imminent. In recent years, courts
have been called upon to determine if
a terminally ill person has the right to
refuse or discontinue medical treat-
ment. This issue arises in two con-
texts. The most frequent situation
involves an incompetent patient for
whom a third party is seeking to be
appointed guardian for the purpose
of making the patient's medical deci-
sions. The question has also been
raised in instances where the patient is
competent to make his own decisions.
A competent individual has the
right to refuse medical treatment
unless the state can demonstrate a
compelling interest that would justify
FORUM
overriding that individual's choice. In
Re Osborne, 294 A.2d 372 (D.C. 1972).
The state has an interest in the pres-
ervation of life, the protection of
third parties such as dependent child-
ren, the prevention of suicide and in
maintaining the ethical integrity of
the medical profession.
"Rational suicide" is a concept by
which a terminally ill patient decides
to take his or her own life by choosing
not to prolong life by medical means
in an instance where there is no hope
of restoring health. This concept raises
legal, medical and moral issues. The
rational suicide theory is not meant to
encourage people to die, but to point
out that if for medical reasons life
becomes unbearable, self deliverance
is a right patients should have.
J. Skelly Wright, Chief Judge of the
United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia, feels that
there is growing acceptance of the
right to die concept. The Vatican Dec-
laration on euthanasia, though repeat-
ing the Roman Catholic Church's
stand against euthanasia, recognized
the patient's right to terminate treat-
ment. Podgers, 'Rational Suicide' Raises
Patients Rights Issues, 66 American Bar
Association Journal 1499 (Dec. 1980).
In view of these changing attitudes,
"right to die" bills will be brought up in
many state legislatures in the near
future. Presently ten states and the
District of Columbia have enacted
such statutes. Such so called "natural
death acts" allow people to draw up
documents instructing physicians con-
cerning the circumstances under
which they become incompetent to
make further decisions. Battiata, Va.
Judge Rules Patient Can Shut Off Life
Support, Washington Post Jan. 12,1982
at 1, col. 1. Maryland and Virginia
have yet to enact similar legislation.
Furthermore, state laws classifying
attempted suicide as a crime have
been largely eliminated and there
have been recent reforms in laws
against aiding and abetting suicide.
Aside from suicide clauses common
to most life insurance policies, legal
barriers to the settlement of estates
of persons who have committed sui-
cide have also been eliminated.
The case of Karen Quinlan brought
the right to die issue to the forefront.
In that case, the New Jersey Supreme
Court held that a patient could choose
to discontinue use of a mechanical
respirator based upon the constitu-
tional right to privacy, and in cases
where the patient is incompetent,
such right could be asserted by his or
her court-appointed guardian. The
Court reached its ruling by analysis of
the state's interests, the foremost of
which was the state interest in the
preservation and sanctity of life. The
Court found the state's interest di-
minishes as the magnitude of bodily
invasion involved in the treatment
increases and the prognosis decreases.
In Re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10,355 A.2d 647
(1976).
The Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts analogized the "right
to die" situation to that of abortion,
stating that as the constitutional right
to privacy protects a woman's right to
terminate pregnancy under certain
conditions, it also encompasses the
right of a patient to preserve his or
her right to privacy against unwanted
infringements of bodily integrity in
appropriate circumstances. The Court
found this right to exist regardless of
whether a patient is incompetent or
competent. In cases of incompetency,
the court would appoint a guardian. It
was emphasized that there is a great
difference between the weight ac-
corded the state's interest in preserv-
ing life when the proposed treatment
will cure the illness, and the weight
given when the treatment can only be
expected to briefly extend the life of
the patient. Superintendent of Beichertown
v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d
417 (1977), McGinley, The Right to Pri-
vacy and Terminally Ill Patient: Establishing
the "Right to Die," 31 Mercer L.Rev. 603,
(Winter 1980).
In 1980, a New York court held
that a terminally ill, comatose patient
is free to exercise his or her common
law right of bodily self determination
and 14th Amendment rights to with-
draw from a life-sustaining respirator.
The holding was based upon the con-
stitutional right to privacy.The Court
reasoned that as a matter of estab-
lished fact, such a patient has no
health and, in the true sense, no life,
for the state to protect. It was empha-
sized that the ultimate decision in
such cases remains with the court
rather than the hospital involved or
guardian of the patient in question.
The Court insulated the individuals
involved in that particular case and in
further cases from criminal liability
providing court procedures are fol-
lowed, thus seeking to prevent un-
sound determinations of life-support
systems, while facilitating judicial
review of all such cases. Eichner v. Dil-
lon, 426 N.Y.S.2d 517 (1980).
On January 11, 1982, the Alexan-
dria Circuit Court of Virginia ruled
that a 72 year old patient must be
allowed to remove himself from life
sustaining equipment although it
would surely result in the patient's
death. Judge Albert H. Grenadier said
that the patient was "legally compe-
tent and sufficiently informed" to
make the decision and that a patient
"has the unfettered right to control
his own destiny." In this instance, the
court found that the patient's consti-
tutional right to privacy and his right
to individual free choice and self de-
termination outweighed the state's
interests. The hospital stated that it
would not appeal the decision. Jeff
Stryker of the President's Commis-
sion for the study of Ethical Problems
in Medicine said that "under the gen-
eral doctrine of informed consent, a
patient has control over his own
body." Battiata, Va. Judge Rules Patient
Can Shut Off Life Support, Washington
Post, January 12, 1982 at 1, col. 1.
In "right to die" cases, the issue of
competency is crucial. The critical fac-
tor in determining incompetence is
the patient's comprehension of the
choice between death and treatment.
Factors the courts have considered to
determine the weight of the state's
interest in "right to die" cases are age
of the patient, prognosis, expense of
treatment and pain.
Despite growing acceptance of
"right to die" statutes, natural death
acts and the "rational suicide" concept,
resistance remains strong. Such re-
sistance comes from the fear that
acceptance could lead to abuse and
even advocacy of euthanasia.
